نوع المستند : مقالة علمية و بحثية
المؤلفون
1 أستاذ، قسم القانون الدولي، كلية الحقوق، جامعة قم، قم، ایران.
2 عضو هيئة تدريس، جامعة وارث الأنبياء، كربلاء، العراق؛ طالب دكتوراه في القانون العام، كلية الحقوق، جامعة قم، قم، إيران.
المستخلص
الكلمات الرئيسية
عنوان المقالة [English]
المؤلفون [English]
Judicial review of legislation does not perform its expected role in many Arab legal systems, despite the constitutional and statutory provisions that establish and regulate it. This gap between the existence of a review body and its actual performance constitutes the central problem addressed by this study. Why does the effectiveness of constitutional review differ among Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon? What elements, beyond the mere breadth of jurisdiction, influence such effectiveness? Building on these questions, the study aims to identify the elements that make constitutional review practically exercisable, stable, and enforceable, rather than merely a jurisdiction formally provided for in law. The study adopts a comparative analytical approach, drawing on constitutional provisions, ordinary legislation, and official documents issued by judicial and constitutional bodies. The findings demonstrate that breadth of jurisdiction alone is insufficient to ensure effective constitutional review. Rather, effectiveness is determined by the interaction of four elements: genuine institutional independence, clarity of jurisdictional boundaries, accessibility to constitutional review, and the capacity of constitutional decisions to be implemented and produce their intended effects. Egypt, for example, has broad and centralized constitutional jurisdiction; however, access to its Supreme Constitutional Court involves complex procedural avenues, which may delay the resolution of certain disputes. Lebanon, by contrast, has a narrower scope of jurisdiction, but its avenues of access are more clearly defined, enabling the Constitutional Council to act more swiftly in certain cases. The Iraqi experience demonstrates that the multiplicity of jurisdictions, in the absence of clear procedural rules, may generate ambiguity and delay rather than strengthen constitutional review. The study concludes that the effectiveness of constitutional review depends, more than on the breadth of jurisdiction, on the coherence and interaction of independence, clarity, access, and enforcement. The study’s principal contribution lies in proposing a four-element model for assessing the effectiveness of constitutional review. This model does not offer a ready-made formula that can be transplanted wholesale from one legal system to another; rather, it emphasizes the need to adapt and balance these elements within the specific institutional and legal context of each state.
الكلمات الرئيسية [English]