نوع المستند : مقالة علمية و بحثية
المؤلفون
1 طالب دكتوراه، قسم القانون العام، كلية الحقوق، جامعة قم، قم، إيران
2 قسم القانون العام، كلية الحقوق، جامعة قم، قم، ایران
المستخلص
الكلمات الرئيسية
عنوان المقالة [English]
المؤلفون [English]
This study examines the impact of central bank independence on the efficiency of financial institution supervision through a comparative legal analysis of the Iraqi and French experiences. Although both countries' laws expressly recognize the principle of central bank independence, the effect of this principle on supervisory effectiveness—given the differing legislative and institutional structures of the two systems—remains an underexplored area in comparative analytical research. The study aims to analyze the legal framework of independence, clarify the supervisory competencies of the central bank, and measure the impact of its institutional, functional, and financial dimensions on improving supervisory performance and reinforcing monetary and financial stability. The study adopts a comparative analytical methodology, based on the examination of legislative texts, the review of jurisprudential opinions, and the analysis of relevant official and international reports. The findings reveal that, despite explicitly enshrining central bank independence, the Central Bank of Iraq Law No. (56) of 2004 suffers from deficiencies in provisions concerning the safeguards for the dismissal of the Governor and board members, as well as ambiguity in financial independence arrangements, all of which constrain supervisory effectiveness. By contrast, the French experience—operating within the framework of the European System of Central Banks—provides more integrated institutional safeguards, rendering it a more efficient model for balancing independence with accountability. The study concludes that strengthening effective independence requires clear legislative reform, particularly regarding legal protections for the Bank's decisions and funding guarantees, alongside the establishment of transparent accountability and disclosure mechanisms. Accordingly, the study recommends a revision of the Iraqi legal provisions regulating central bank independence, and the adaptation of relevant elements of the French experience to suit the specificity of Iraq's legal and institutional context, so as to enhance supervisory efficiency and ensure sustainable financial stability.
Keywords: Central Bank Independence; Supervision of Financial Institutions; Legal Framework; Iraqi Law; French Experience; Supervisory Efficiency; Monetary and Financial Stability.
الكلمات الرئيسية [English]
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